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Tax needn’t be taxing, but in the case of organ 
donation it might bea 
 
Abstract 
Petersen and Lippert-Rasmussen argue that, while a tax credit scheme to 
encourage organ donation would be costly, the increased number of organs 
for transplantation would lead to other savings in the healthcare system. In 
the present work some calculations are provided and it is suggested that, 
even given optimistic assumptions, the cost to the state of implementing the 
system as proposed would be high and unlikely to garner the support of 
politicians and policymakers. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2012-100501  
 
In their article Peterson and Lippert-Rasmussen present arguments in 
favour of giving a tax break to those who agree during their lifetimes to 
become organ donors following their deaths. The authors suggest that the 
scheme could work one of two ways. In the first, individuals would receive 
an annual tax credit for agreeing to donate their organs after death; and, in 
the second, they receive a one-off larger tax credit upon consenting to the 
scheme. There is much to recommend their proposal. If successful it would 
increase the numbers of organs available for transplantation and, thus, 
ameliorate suffering and save lives. While such a scheme might offer 
enough of an incentive to individuals to make their organs available, the 
level of tax credit suggested (£200/annum) is unlikely to affect those 
wholly against donation. Nonetheless, it might be enough to sway those 
who are either indifferent or who support donation yet have not taken active 
steps to sign up to the register. For this reason, the scheme would not fall 
foul of interference with autonomy type objections which might be 
deployed at certain incentive schemes. My concern with the scheme is of a 
pragmatic nature and is about the economic viability of a tax credit scheme. 
Their article argues that while such a scheme would be costly, the increased 
number of organs for transplantation would lead to other savings in the 
healthcare system (p. X).1 I offer some initial calculations and suggest that, 
even given optimistic assumptions, the cost to the state of implementing the 
system as proposed would be unlikely to garner the support of the 
politicians and policy-makers.  
There are a variety of factors which can affect whether or not an 
organ transplant is cost-effective. These include the type of organ being 
transplanted, how good of a match the organ is for the recipient, the disease 
group which the patient belongs to, whether the organ is from a living or 
deceased donor, and whether single or multiple organs are being 
                                                 
a
 I would like to thank Brian Willis and Thomas Douglas for their comments on earlier 
drafts of this commentary. 
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transplanted (pp. 91-92).2 Kidney transplants for end-stage renal failure 
have been shown to be cost-saving in comparison to dialysis treatment. Yet, 
while these may be less costly in comparison to medical management, this 
is not the case for other organs (p. 75).2 The reason for this is that dialysis 
for renal failure is a much more expensive treatment than the non-transplant 
therapies for other organ-related dysfunction. There are, thus, savings to be 
made in moving patients off of dialysis via a kidney transplant, but similar 
savings may not be made in transplanting other organs. A report of the 
Organ Donation Taskforce (ODT) which looked at the economic case for 
organ transplantation suggested that, if the number of organs available for 
transplantation increases, so long as the numbers of kidneys increases as 
well the higher net costs for other organs would be offset (p. 75). However, 
none of the studies examined in the ODT report take into account any extra 
costs which might be associated with the introduction of a tax credit for 
donations. Let us, therefore, examine what impact this might have on costs. 
While I do not purport to present a comprehensive economic analysis here, 
a few simple calculations will give us an idea of the general feasibility of 
such a scheme. 
In 2010/11 3,740 transplants took place in the United Kingdom (p. 
5).
3
 Petersen and Lippert-Rasmussen surmise that the introduction of a tax 
credit might yield a 10% increase in the number of people joining the organ 
donation register and that this, in turn, could lead to a 10% increase in the 
numbers of organs available for transplantation (p. X).1 For the sake of 
argument I am going to make some assumptions; this is to err on the side of 
generosity with regards to the calculations. First, I presume that all the extra 
transplants are kidney transplants. This is because, as noted above, 
transplanting dialysis patients can achieve savings that other transplants 
cannot. Secondly, I am assuming that the dialysis space made available 
because of the transplant is not simply filled by other patients (thereby 
negating any savings). Thirdly, I assume that all the extra patients 
transplanted were previously on dialysis and did not go straight onto the 
transplant list (otherwise each transplant would represent a net cost on the 
baseline of no treatment). 
On average a kidney transplant could save £120,203/patient over 20 
years in comparison to the cost of dialysis (table 1). The postulated 374 
extra transplants (10%) generated by the tax credit scheme could save the 
NHS £44.9 million over 20 years. This equates to an average yearly saving 
of about £2.2 million (table 1); although this is not strictly linear since 
transplantation costs are initially high with savings being made over time in 
comparison to dialysis. It should be noted that studies underestimate the 
wider societal economic benefits of transplantation, such as employment, as 
these are hard to measure (p. 76).2 In their paper the authors cite £300,000 
worth of economic benefits per kidney transplant patient over 10 years 
(£600,000 over 20 years). Yet, it is difficult to interpret the exact meaning 
and relevance to transplantation of this figure. It is based on an estimation 
of yearly economic benefit of an average living donor kidney transplant 
given by Gaston et al. (p. 2550).4 However, this seems to misinterpret the 
data upon which they base their estimation. The original data from Murphy 
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and Topel were not about transplantation, but an estimation of the economic 
benefits of increased life-span due to health improvements.58 The study 
noted that between 1970 and 1998 the life expectancy of men aged 50 
increased from 21.8 to 26.6 years, a gain of 4.8 years. The gain for women 
in this period was 2.8 years. They then estimated that the economic value of 
these gains were $350,000 and $180,000 respectively per person (pp. s116-
s117). Gaston et al. misinterpret this as being a ‘per year’ figure and 
subsequently derived what they deemed to be a ‘conservative’ estimate of 
the economic benefits of transplantation based on this. Whether or not this 
is in fact ‘conservative is questionable since the figure is far in excess of the 
average one which I have given. As such, I will refer to it as ‘optimistic’. 
For our potential extra 374 patients the optimistic figure would represent a 
saving to the NHS of £224.4 million over 20 years and a yearly average 
saving of £11.2 million (table 1). 
At the end of March 2011 there were approximately 17.8 million 
people on the donor register; a 10% increase due to the introduction of a tax 
credit system would yield 1.78 million extra people registered. If, as per the 
assumption in the article, those extra people were in the 50% tax band, the 
tax credits would cost the state £178 million/annum (table 2). Neither the 
average nor the optimistic figures for savings made by transplanting extra 
dialysis patients come close to offsetting the cost of the suggested annual 
tax credit scheme; indeed the scheme would involve a net cost to the state 
of £175.8m (average) or £166.8m (optimistic) net respectively per annum 
(table 2). Most people, however, do not pay 50% income tax and, as such, 
the figure derived from this represents a great overestimation of the cost to 
the state for the tax credits. Despite this, even if we re-calculate using the 
current lower tax rate (20%), we can see that, although the scheme costs 
substantially less, it would still be around £60-69m per annum (table 2).  
Given the costs of an annual scheme, one-off tax credits, such as the 
authors propose, might be more attractive to the politicians and policy-
makers. A one-off tax credit scheme would not incur the same repeated 
annual costs and so would represent a less expensive option. We can see 
from table 2 that, if the savings gained by the extra transplants were in line 
with the optimistic figures given by Petersen and Lippert-Rasmussen, the 
state would actually save money. However, there are some reasons to think 
that such savings would not be achieved. First, the optimistic figure is far in 
excess of the average savings suggested by other studies. Secondly, as 
noted earlier, the calculations presented here are based on savings to be 
gained in kidney transplantation. Kidney transplants represent 
approximately 70% rather than 100% of all transplants (p. 5).3 For this 
reason, any savings made by the state in a one-off tax credit scheme could 
well be wiped out, even if optimistic savings are achieved elsewhere 
because of the extra transplants. Further, it is likely that, contra my 
assumptions, (1) the dialysis spaces made available because of the 
transplant would be filled by other patients, negating any savings made by 
moving a transplant patient off of dialysis and (2) some patients would be 
transplanted who have never been on dialysis, thus creating a net cost rather 
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than saving. Lastly, I calculated the one-off tax credit figures at the level of 
£200, not a larger sum as suggested by the authors in their article. 
One solution to this would be to set the amount of the tax credit at a 
lower level than the authors suggest so that the state would not carry 
significant extra costs by implementing the system. This, however, might 
affect the numbers of extra people who sign up to the register and, thus, the 
numbers of extra transplants gained. Of course, economic concerns need 
not defeat (ethically or practically) attempts to incentivise organ donation. 
We might think that the overall benefits, in terms of lives saved and 
improvements in quality of life, of having more organs to transplant 
outweigh any increase in costs in purely economic terms. However, 
whether or not the political will could be found to implement such a system 














Total savings of 
transplants over  dialysis 
over 20 years £ 0.12m* £ 44.9mǂ £ 0.6m† £ 224.4m‡ 
     Annual savings of 
transplant over dialysis £ 0.006m £ 2.2m £ 0.03m £ 11.2m 
* This rough figure is the average of savings cited in three studies
6,7,8
 which were used in the 
economic analysis done by the Organ Donation Taskforce.3 All other figures were worked out 
from this. The original table is available on p. 79 of the OTD Report. 
ǂ £0.12m savings/patient/20yrs x 374 extra transplants = £44.88m 
† This figure which I have termed ‘optimistic is based on Petersen & Lippert-Rasmussen’s 
assumptions. £0.3m of benefits over 10yrs = £0.6 over 20yrs 





Annual tax credit 
Annual 
cost  




Annual net cost 
after savings 
50% tax £ 178.0m* £ 175.8mǂ £ 178.0m £ 166.8m 
20% tax £ 71.2m† £ 69.0m £ 71.2m £ 60.0m 
     
 
Average Optimistic 
One off tax credit 
Cost over  
20 yrs 
Net cost after  
savings over  20 
yrs 
Cost over  
20 yrs 
Net cost after 
savings over 20 
yrs 
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50% tax £ 178.0m £ 133.1m £ 178.0m £ -46.4m 
20% tax  £ 71.2m £ 26.3m £ 71.2m £ -153.2m 
* 1.78m x £200 x 50% = £178m 
† 1.78m x £200 x 20% = £71.2m 
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